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In July of 1998 something rather mundane happened: Lucas Rosa
walked into Park West Bank in Holyoke, Massachusetts and asked for a
loan application. Since it was a warm summer day, and because she'
wanted to look credit-worthy, Rosa wore a blousey top over stockings.
Suddenly, the mundane transformed into the exceptional: When asked
for some identification, Rosa was told that no application would be
forthcoming until and unless she went home, changed her clothes and
returned attired in more traditionally masculine/male clothing. Rosa, a
biological male who identifies herself as female was, it seems, denied a
loan application on that ground.
Outraged at such treatment, and convinced that her attire had no
relevance to her credit-worthiness, Rosa filed an action in federal court
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,2 claiming that she had been
discriminated against on the basis of her sex.! Was Rosa discriminated
against on the basis of his male sex, on the basis of her female gender, or
on some other basis that may or may not fall comfortably under the sex
discrimination provisions of the ECOA? After all, the ECOA was en-
acted by Congress in 1974, in large part to curtail the practice among
creditors of refusing to grant a wife's credit application without a guar-
anty from her husband Did Rosa's case present some radical
Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for the Study of Law and Culture, Columbia
University.
1. In this introduction, I will refer to Lucas Rosa with a feminine pronoun, as that is
what she prefers, and it is a common practice for referring to a transgender person
who self-identifies as female, the advice and guidance of mental health and other
professionals who work with TG dients, and the practice followed by most courts.
See, e.g., Schwenk v. Harford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000); Murray v.
United States Bureau of Prisons, 106 F.3d 401, 401 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished disposition); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 408 n.1 (7th Cit.
1987).
2. 15 U.S.C. % 1691-1691f (hereinafter ECOA).
3. In fact, the complaint was framed using male pronouns for Rosa. The complaint
contained other allegations not germane to this discussion.
4. Mayes v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 37 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1994).
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interpretation of sex discrimination principles, or threaten to stretch the
bounds of the ECOA well beyond the scope intended by its authors in
1974? 1 thought not, and to my delight the First Circuit has agreed.
To those of us who work in this area, Rosa's case was far from odd,
marginal or hybrid in some exotic way. Instead, her treatment at the
hands of the Park West Bank loan officer reflected an everyday occur-
rence for countless people who fail to conform to rather traditional
gender norms, notably, something experienced more often by people
who get caught displaying inappropriate femininity.! Rather than un-
derstand Rosa's experience as lying well beyond the bounds of laws
relating to sex-stereotyping, she is better understood as a sort of canary
in the sartorial coal mine: She was simply the most visible victim of
systemic gender norms that regulate all of us in the ways in which we
coherently present ourselves to the world as "men" or "women." The
refusal that Rosa experienced from Park West Bank was merely the
sharp edge of the gender-based discipline according to which we all
routinely operate in virtually all aspects of our lives.
Rosa and her counsel drew a senior judge in the District Court in
Massachusetts to hear the case. In October, 1999, Judge Frank Freed-
man dismissed Rosa's ECOA claim on the ground that "the issue in this
case is not his sex, but rather how he chose to dress when applying for a
loan. Because the Act does not prohibit discrimination based on the
manner in which someone dresses, Park West's requirement that Rosa
change his clothes does not give rise to claims of illegal discrimination."6
So what, after all, do clothes have to do with sex discrimination?
They are supposed to "make the man," after all. Any connection was
totally lost on Judge Freedman. Yet many queer and feminist scholars
and activists do not find this a difficult question, indeed many law re-
view articles have been devoted to this topic. 7 And, of course, it seems
obvious that the question is easily resolved by the Supreme Court's deci-
5. This was Mary Anne Case's point in Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Ori-
entation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudence, 105 YAE LJ. 1
(1995).
6. Bench Order, Lucas Rosa v. Park West Bank and Trust Company, Civ. Action No.
99-30085-FHF, October 18, 1999 at 1-2. The Bench Order is part of the record ap-
pendix, which is on file with the MichiganJournal of Gender d-Law.
7. See, e.g., Karl E. Kare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEw
ENG. L. REv. 1395 (1992); Lynne D. Mapes-Riordan, Sex Discrimination and Em-
ployer Weight and Appearance Standards, 16 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 493 (1991); Mary
Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HaRv.
WOMEN'S LJ. 73 (1982). For the connection between clothing/hair and race dis-
crimination, see Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365 (1991).
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sion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins wherein the Court held that sex
discrimination principles applied to a woman who was denied a pro-
motion because she was believed to act insufficiently feminine.9 In Price
Waterhouse, the Supreme Court clearly held that clothing-based sex
stereotyping fell squarely within the sex discrimination protections of
federal law. Yet a number of years after the case was decided by the Su-
preme Court, it has had less effect upon cases, such as Rosa's, than I
might have hoped. Indeed, Judge Freedman's opinion in Rosa's case
dismissed the relevance of Price Waterhouse altogether, holding that:"neither a man nor a woman can change their status from unprotected
to protected simply by changing his or her clothing."'0
When Rosa and her counsel, Jennifer Levi, decided to appeal the
dismissal of the complaint to the First Circuit, they called me to see if I
would be interested in writing an amicus brief on Rosa's behalf. My job,
as Levi and I saw it, was to reassure the First Circuit that this case fit
comfortably within the scope of well-established sex discrimination ju-
risprudence that dealt with gender-based stereotypes. Levi, correctly I
believe, calculated that an access to credit case presented a better factual
situation in which to get a circuit court to affirm Price Waterhouse than
did employment cases where the employer's desire to fire a man in a
dress might intuitively, yet mistakenly, resonate with the court's notion
of legitimate business necessity. What, in contrast, could a person's at-
tire have to do with credit-worthiness?
What follows are the principal and amicus briefs to the First Cir-
cuit." Thereafter, Jennifer Levi provides some reflections on the First
Circuit's opinion. Both Levi and I share some reservations about what is
otherwise a rather wonderful victory in this case. Not wanting to tip our
hand to the detriment of future litigation in this area, you will under-
stand that we will remain rather cryptic about these reservations.
Nevertheless, the collaboration that these two briefs represent was
an exceptional opportunity for me, as it offered the chance to translate
8. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
9. "[We are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming
or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for "'[in
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Con-
gress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes."' Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 1375, n. 13, 55 L.Ed.2d 657
(1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (CA7
1971)." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
10. Bench Order, supra note 6, at 2.
11. The First Circuit opinion is available at 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
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my more theoretical writing on sex, gender, performance, identity and
equality into an argument that courts would understand and accept.
Levi and I spent hours discussing theories of the case, notions of gender
identity, and ways to win this issue with minimal collateral damage. I
truly appreciated the opportunity to work with a sharp and thoughtful
litigator who, as a public interest lawyer, has the challenging task of
maintaining a dual focus on the interests of her client and the larger is-
sues advanced by her client's claims. We both offer these briefs as an
example of the dynamic collaboration that can take place in litigation
when theory and practice are brought to bear on difficult questions of
equality.
In the end, this and other similar cases raise an interesting set of
questions: What is a question of gender discrimination a question of?
How is gender-based discrimination to be differentiated from sex-based
discrimination? Or is Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg correct in using
these two terms interchangeably?12 Why are some courts so obstinate in
confusing gender bias with sexual orientation bias? What, in the end, do
sex, gender and sexual orientation based discrimination have to do with
one another? t
12. See, e.g., "Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demon-
strate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action. Today's skeptical
scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to
volumes of history." U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)(emphasis supplied).
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